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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF COMMIUNITY
PROPERTY
ALLEN C. STEERE*
The Origin of the Community Property System
"And we say it shall be the same of men as of women"L
This is a direct quotation from the Fuero Juzgo (Book of the
Judges), a Visigothic Code attributed to the year 693 A.D. It
comes to us by translations which are twice removed from the
monkish Latin in which it was originally recorded. While this
early code is principally of historic interest, it recognized
both separate and community property, and provided that
either spouse could leave his share of the common property to
his children, or relatives, or to others as he wished. But under
it community property instead of being equally owned was
divided proportionately depending upon which spouse was
richer than the other.
In the five and one-half centuries following, the idea
of proportionate division was cast aside, and equality between
husband and wife in the ownership of property acquired dur-
ing marriage became well established as a property system.
The following quotation, written almost seven centuries ago,
incorporates the basic concept of the community property
system as it exists today. Law 1 of the Spanish Fuero Real,
1255 A.D., reads:
"Everything the husband and wife may earn or purchase during
union, let them both have it by halves; and if it is a gift of
the King or other person, and given to both, let husband and
wife have it; and if given to one, let that one alone have it to
whom it may have been given."2
The idea of proprietary equality between the spouses was
* Assistant Counsel, The Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., Ft.
Wayne, Indiana, LL.B., University .of Texas 1931. Member of In-
diana Bar (1937) and Texas Bar (1931). Address delivered at the
Annual Meeting of The Indiana State Bar Association at Evans-
ville, Indiana, September 5, 1947.
1. From a translation of the Fuero Juzgo as set forth in 2 de
Funiak, "Principles of Community Property" 4.
2. From a translation set forth in 2 de Funiak, op. cit. supra, n.
1 at 13. (Originally Law 1, Title 3, Book 3 of the Fuero Real,
promulgated in 1255, andcontinued into the Nueva Recopilacion
in 1567, as Law 2, Title 9, Book 5.)
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also clear in the Spanish Codes promulgated in 1263, 1348,
1502 and 1567.3 However, as a property system the idea of
community property is much older than the Spanish Codes.
Historians tell us that it existed in unwritten form among
the Germanic tribes and that one of these, the Visigoths,
carried it into parts of France and into Spain where it later
developed and became an integral part of the written law.4
On this continent the establishment of the community
property system was but a continuation of the laws of Span-
ish jurisprudence. California, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas,
Arizona, Idaho, Nevada and Washington are the original
community property states. In an early Spanish-Mexican
code, community property was defined as all property of
whatever nature the spouses acquired by their own labor and
industry. However, the fruits and income from separate pro-
perty became a part of the common gain. In some present
day statutes there has been a departure from the original
concept, and the income from separate property remains the
separate property of the owning spouse. In the Spanish-
Mexican Code under consideration separate property was de-
fined much as it is today. It consisted of the property owned
by either spouse before marriage and that acquired after
marriage "by a gratuitous title, such as inheritance, donation
or bequest."
Because colonial Louisiana was both a French and Span-
ish possession, and derived its law from the Custom of Paris
as well as the laws of Spain,5 it becomes interesting to know
that the community background of the two countries is sim-
ilar, the Germanic customary law having influenced the Cus-
toms of Paris and Orleans which had the principles of a per-
fect community system; the Code Napoleon being based there-
on.6
These references to the sources and origin of the com-
munity property system illustrate the importance of Spanish
concepts in the interpretation of our own laws as they exist
today. The community property states have adopted by
3. See "The Modern Problem of the Nature of the Wife's Interest
in Community Property-A Comparative Study" 19 Cal. Law
Rev. 567-601 (1931).
4. 1 de Funiak, op. cit. supra, n. 1, c. 2.
5. 1 de Funiak, op. cit. supra, n. 1 at 88, n. 43.
6. Daggett, supra, n. 3.
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statutes, and in some instances by constitution, patterns of
these early codes and in the early cases in this country there
are frequent references to the source law.
The Nature of the Wife's Interest in Community Property
While the laws of the eight original community property
states have the same origin, there have been marked differ-
ences in the interpretation of the Spanish law. One of the
most interesting of these controversies has been in rela-
tion to the nature of the wife's interest in community prop-
erty. Based upon reasons of public policy and social econ-
omy the husband, from the time of the early codes, has
been given broad powers of management and control over
the property of the conjugal partnership. His rights as
managing partner included the power to sell and dispose
of the common property. Under common law concepts the
rights of the husband were considered as equivalent to own-
ership, and the question was often raised in this country as
to whether the wife was in fact an effective owner in the
common property prior to her husband's death. Those ar-
guing for the Spanish concept claimed that the proprietorship
of the husband was but a necessary agency of the commun-
ity; that he was at all times acting in a representative ca-
pacity, and could not sell or otherwise dispose of the com-
munity property in fraud of or to the prejudice of the rights
of the wife. But on this question even the continental au-
thors were in disagreement. 7
Escriche said that the wife had ownership rights only
after the death of the husband, but Manresa said that the
proprietorship of the wife was not nominal and theoretical
but real and effective.8 A French author, Troplong, com-
pared the community to a partnership which begins only at
the end.9
Having in mind the conflicting viewpoints expressed by
continental authors, one becomes sympathetic with the dif-
ferent conclusions which were carried forward in the early
decisions in the United States. In a Louisiana case, Guice
7. Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601, 218 Pac. 22 (1923). See 2
de Funiak, op. cit. supra, n. 1 at 29; 4 id. at 277, 281.
8. Daggett, supra, n. 3.
9. Garrozi v. Dastas, 204 U.S. 64 (1907).
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v. Lawrence,10 the views of Febrero were adopted and it was
held that the wife's interest was a mere expectancy, the same
as that of an heir; that it was not until the death of the hus-
band that the wife became the irrevocable and effective own-
er. Relying upon Louisiana authority, this view was also
carried forward in California. 1 But in Texas12 and in Wash-
ington-3 from the time of the earliest cases, it has been con-
sistently held that the interest of the wife in community
property is present, fully vested and equivalent to that of
her husband. One of our American textwriters tells us that
the writings of men like Febrero were either inaccurate or
misinterpreted in translation,1 4 and that under Spanish law
the wife has at all times been an effective owner of her in-
terest in the community. Mr. Justice Holmes has also made
reference to the difficulties encountered in the translation of
ambiguous words.15 Louisiana, however, has overruled the
original cases, and it is now settled law in that state that
the wife has a present, vested interest in community prop-
erty equal to that of the husband.' 6  Effective July 29, 1927,
California, in order to gain income tax advantage for her
citizens, changed its law by statute, and in that state also
the interests of the husband and wife in property acquired
after the statute date are present, existing and equal.,
The Status of Community Property under Federal Income
Tax Laws
This discussion of the nature of the wife's interest in
community property furnishes proper background for what
10. Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann. 226 (1847); See Jacob v. Falgoust,
90 So. 426 (1922).
11. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 172 Cal. 175, 158 Pac. 537 (1916. Roberts
v. Weluneyer, 191 Cal. 601, 218 Pac. 22 (1923).
12. Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930); Arnold v. Leonard, 114
Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); Zimpelman v. Robb, 53 Tex. 274
(1880) ; Wright v. Hays, 10 Tex. 130, 60 Am. Dec. 200 (1853).
13. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Warburton v. ,White, 176
U.S. 494 (1899); Holyoke v. Jackson, 3 Wash. Terr, 235, 3 Pac.
841 (1882).
101 (1930);
14. 1 de Funiak, op. cit. supra, n. 1 at 281, 294.
15. Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 36 L.R.A. (NS) 1040 (1911).
16. Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930); Phillips v. Phillips, 160
La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
17. Cal. Civil Code (Deering 1941), §161a.
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in recent years has been the most important development in
the law of community property. In the case of United States
v. Robbins,8 the Supreme Court, acting on California law,
held that the husband's powers of control respecting commun-
ity property were so comprehensive that they were equivalent
to ownership, and that income from community property was
taxable to the husband alone. Prior to the decision in the
Robbins case, the Treasury Department had concluded that
the husband and wife as equal owners had the right to divide
community income and file separate returns. Following the
decision in the Robbins case, all administrative rulings on
the subject of community property were withdrawn and test
cases were filed in Texas, Washington, Louisiana and Arizona.
It was the Government's theory that the powers of the hus-
band in the management of community property afforded him
practical if not actual rights of ownership. However, the
Supreme Court rejected this contention in Poe v. Seaborn,0
and held that under Washington law the wife has a present,
vested interest in one-half of the community property, and
regardless of who actually earned the income. The practical
advantage afforded by this holding will be readily apparent.
By dividing community income, husband and wife in the com-
munity property states have been able to compute income
tax liability under reduced surtax rates. Poe v. Seaborn and
the related cases 20 were decided in 1930; the original depart-
mental rulings date from 1920, and it seems inexcusable that
this inequality in our taxing laws has not been fully adjusted
long prior to this date. The attorneys in community property
states have pointed out that the community property system
is not the only one which gives tax advantage. The following
quotation is from Respondent's brief filed in Hopkins v.
Bacon :21
"It is by no means certain that the community system gives
any tax advantages to taxpayers in these states. In the
forty states of the Union not having the community system,
their own systems have been so changed by Statutes, have
become modernized, individualistic systems, have adapted to
their social needs such civil law and common law conceptions
18. 269 U.S. 315 (1926). See C.C.H., Fed. Tax Rep., 9951-53.
19. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
20. Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930). Hopkins v. Bacon, 282
U.S. 122 (1930). Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
21. 282 U.S. 122 (1930).
[Vol 23
THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
as joint estates, tenancies by entireties, equitable trusts, mar-
iage agreements and settlements, gifts inter vivos, wage agree-
ments, and the like, as automatically to create separations of
incomes between husbands and wives. Collectively, they may
be of more significance and influence in a particular State
in dividing the gross gains of husbands and wives between
them, and to make the principle of divided returns of more
effective application in them, than the simpler and more uni-
form community systems existing in the community property
states. At all events, there is as much reason for the Courts
to say that the property arrangements in the forty states which
have not the community system are aimed at tax evasion as
to say that the simpler, more uniform, Statute regulated, two
thousand years old community systems were designed for tax
evasions."22
Five States have recently adopted the community prop-
erty sygtem. The quoted argument is unique and has merit,
but respecting earned income at least, a definite tax advan-
tage appears to exist; and five states, impatient of Federal
delay, have recently adopted the community property sys-
tem. Oklahoma was the first to act. Its proximity to Texas
together with overlapping interests in oil were the factors
which combined to make Oklahoma doubly conscious of the
income taX advantage enjoyed by husband and wife in com-
munity property states. Oklahoma's first community prop-
erty law became effective July 29, 1939,23 but the Supreme
Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Harmon-
disapproved it because husband and wife were given the
right to elect whether they desired to come under its terms.
At the next session of the Oklahoma legislature a new law,
effective as to all citizens, was substituted.25  It was ap-
proved by the Treasury Department. Professor de Funiak
has said that the Oklahoma law is a good one.26
During the present year, Pennsylvania, Nebraska and
Oregon have adopted community property laws modeled on
the Oklahoma Act of 1945, but the Michigan statute, also
enacted this year, is different in many respects and appears
to have been independently drafted.
22. Brief for Respondent, p. 60; Hopkins v. Bacon, supra n. 24.
23. Okla. Session Laws, 1939, pp. 356, 360.
24. 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
25. Okla. Session Laws, 1945, pp. 118-121.
26. de Funiak, "The New Community Property Law" 16 J. Okla. Bar
Ass'n, 1123, 1124.
19471
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Those who follow legislative matters know that a com-
munity property bill, copied almost verbatim from the Okla-
homa law, was introduced in the 85th Indiana General
Assembly ;27 but the bill was not ready for vote until the
closing days of the session, and the final vote, which was
one of postponement, seems to indicate that the legislature
felt that such a major change in established property laws
was a step deserving of further study and review.
Under Spanish Law the Rents and Revenues from Separate
Property Became a Part of the Common Gain.
Under Spanish law the rents and revenues from separate
property became a part of the common gain, but there has
been a departure from this concept in some of the present
day statutes. In California2 the rents, issues and profits
from separate property remain the separate property of the
owning spouse. Similar statutes have been adopted in Wash-
ington,29 Arizona3 New Mexico, "' and Nevada,-2 but in
Louisiana, Texas and Idaho the original concept still pre-
vails3
It has been suggested that the California statute was
adopted because the legislature did not want the creditors of
the husband to be able to reach the rents and revenues from
the separate property of the wife,8' but Texas has protected
the wife without changing the original idea that rents and
revenues from separate property are a part of the connubial
27. Senate Bill 852 was introduced February 10, 1947. It was re-
ported out of Committee February 25, without recommendation.
It passed the Senate on March 6, by a vote of 28 to 15. Later
in the day, the House stripped Senate Bill 309 of its original con-
tents, and amended it so as to include the community property law
as set forth in Senate Bill 352 plus two amendments. On March
7, Engrossed Senate Bill 309 passed the House 67 to 16. It was
sent back to the Senate on March 8, for concurrence in the House
amendments, and was made a special order of business on March
10; at which time a motion for indefinite postponement prevailed.
28. Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941), §162, 163.
29. Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1943) §§6890, 6891.
30. Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §63-302.
31. N.M. Stat. (1929) §§68-302, 68-303.
32. Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) §3355.
33. Commissioner v. Wilson, 76 F.2nd 766 (1935); Arnold v. Leonard,
114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49
N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010, 1013, 1014.
34. 1 de Funiak, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 182-184.
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estate.35 Under Texas law the rents from the wife's separate
real estate, interest from her bonds and notes, dividends on
her stocks, and her personal earnings constitute community
property; but by special statute this portion of the community
enjoys special immunity, and cannot be made subject to the
payments of debts contracted by the husband, nor does lia-
bility exist for his torts.
The California type statute has been criticized on the
ground that the wife can be left penniless where the husband
at the time of marriage owns a considerable estate, but after
marriage does nothing more than manage it, and collect the
revenues. This results because the rents and profits from
his separate property do not become a part of the conjugal
estate.38 There is, however, a further difficulty which has
arisen from alteration of the Spanish law, and the courts
recognize that it has caused "no end of complications."37
What brings this about is that in many businesses the income
thereof is as much attributable to the skill and labor of the
owner as it is to invested capital; and the courts have been
faced with the problem of attempting to effect an equitable
separation of these two items so that that portion of the
profit which is attributable to personal services can be
brought into the community estate.3 8  Nevada and Arizona
have attempted to solve the problem in the manner herein-
after set forth:
"If profits come mainly from the property, rather than the
joint efforts of the husband and wife, or either of them, they
belong to the owner of the property, although the labor and
skill of one or both may have been given to the business. On
the contrary, if profits come -mainly from the efforts or skill
of one or both, they belong to the community."39
In illustration of this rule, Arizona holds that the success
of a restaurant or a clothes cleaning business is principally
35. Tex. Stat., Rev. Civ. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 4616. See Arnold v.
-Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925).
36. McKay, "Community Property" (1925) c. 4, §74, quoting from
In Re Cudworth's Estate, 133 Cal. 462, 65 Pac. 1041, 1044 (1901).
37. Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010, 1014 (1944).
38. Katson v. Katson, 43 N.M. 214, 89 P.2d 524, 526 (1939); Shea v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 81 F.2d 937, 939 (1936).
89. In Re Torrey's Estate, 54 Ariz. 369, 95 P.2d 990, 993 (1939),
quoting from Lake v. Lake, 18 Nev. 361, 4 Pac. 711, 728, 7 Pac.
74 (1884).
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attributable to the individual toil and application of the own-
ing spouse, and that the income is community property.40
Other methods of meeting the problem have been devised.
Where the owning spouse takes a salary from the business,
that sum has sometimes been used as a measure of the value
of personal services rendered. Other courts have approached
the problem by attempting to determine what is a proper
interest return computed upon the basis of invested capital,
the remaining profit being treated as community property
under the theory that it is attributable to labor and skill.41
Oklahoma which was the first non-community state to
adopt a community property law, provided in its statute that
the rents, interest, dividends, and other income from the
separate property of the wife are community property,42 but
for some reason the Oklahoma statute does not specify wheth-
er rents and profits from the separate property of the hus-
band remain separate property or become a part of the com-
mon gaim So if the Oklahoma law is to be treated as a model,
it seems that it should more clearly define the rights of the
parties in this respect, and in drafting a new statute, the
issue as to whether the Texas or California rule is the proper
one should be clearly met.
The Intrinsic Increase of Separate Lands is Distinguishable
from the Rents and Profits which are Derived Therefrom.
Under Spanish law, the intrinsic increase of separate
lands as distinguished from rents and profits was not shared
with the other spouse.43 Examples of intrinsic increase in-
clude the spontaneous growth and output of land, uncut
meadows of hay, standing timber, undug sand and gravel,
unquarried stone and unmined minerals." Texas, however, is
the only state which has included such a stipulation in its
statutes. Under the Texas statutes, separate property includes
"the increase of all lands" owned or claimed before marriage
and "the increase of all lands" acquired afterwards by gift,
40. Anderson v. Anderson, 177 P.2d 277 (Ariz. 1947).
41. See infra, n. 37, 38.
42. Okla. Session Laws of 1945, p. 118, Tit. 32, §4.
43. 1 de Funiak, op. cit. supra n. 1, §73, making reference to the
work of three Spanish writers.
44. Speer, "Law of Marital Rights in Texas" §411, pp. 500-01. Welder
v. Commissioner of nIternal Revenue, 148 F.2nd 583, 585 (C.C.A.
5th 1945).
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devise or descent.45 The word "increase" has never been
supposed to include rents.46 I do not know why Texas stands
alone in this statutory emphasis of what has always been the
Spanish law.
Dissolution of the Community by Death
Another of the basic concepts of the community property
system is that upon dissolution of the marital partnership by
death, the surviving spouse does not inherit his or her share
in the community. This follows from the fact that each spouse
has been the owner of an equal one-half interest in the marital
property from the time of its original acquisition.
However, apart from and in addition to the one-half
interest which the survivor holds in his or her own right, the
laws of intestate succession often recognize the survivor as
an heir in the administration of the interest of the deceased
spouse. These statutes follow a widely divergent pattern.
Under California law, in the absence of testamentary disposi-
tion, the entire share of the deceased spouse passes to the
survivor so that the survivor becomes the owner of all of
the community. 47 But under the statutes of Texas, Arizona
and Washington, if there are children, they, rather than the
survivor, inherit the entire share of the deceased spouse.48
The survivor, however, is the only heir if the deceased leaves
no children or descendents of deceased children. In Louisiana,
if there are no children, the parents of the deceased spouse
have rights which prime those of the surviving husband or
wife. The wife, however, has a usufruct where there are
issue surviving.49
Under Oklahoma law, the one-half interest of the de-
ceased spouse is subject to the ordinary laws of intestate suc-
cession. A surviving wife and one child share the husband's
one-half interest, equally, so that the wife receives in all
three-fourths of the community and the child one-fourth. If
there is more than one child surviving, the wife takes one-
45. Tex. Stat., Rev. Civ. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 4613, 4614.
46. Commissioner v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766 (C.C.A. 5th 1935); Arnold
v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925).
47. Cal. Prob. Code (Deering 1944) §§201-3.
48. Tex. Stat., Rev. Civ. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 2578; Ariz. Code Ann.(1939) §39-109;Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1939) §1342.
49. La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1945) §§915, 916.
1[9471
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
third of the husband's share in addition to her one-half inter-
est already owned, the remaining two-thirds of the husband's
one-half going to the children.50
McKay, 51 in his textwork, has said that the most glaring
disadvantage of the community property system is the re-
quirement that on the dissolution of the marriage, the gains
shall at once be divided.
My own reaction is that the disadvantages exist more
in theory than in fact. Where the deceased spouse dies tes-
tate, the surviving spouse and the children of the marriage
are the usual devisees; the same ownership usually results
under the laws of intestate succession. Except in isolated
cases, the children and the surviving parent experience no
practical difficulty in liquidating the property of the mari-
tal partnership. Moreover, in states like Oklahoma and in
Texas, the position of the surviving spouse is improved
by statutes which recognize in the surviving spouse special
rights of administration.
Under the Oklahoma statute,2 the surviving spouse ad-
ministers community property in the same manner and with
the same duties, privileges and authority as are vested in a
surviving partner to administer and settle the affairs of a
partnership upon the death of one of the partners. When
community debts have been satisfied, the survivor transfers
and conveys to the personal representatives of the deceased,
the deceased's share of the community, whereupon the com-
munity interest along with other property of the deceased's
estate is administered and distributed either subject to the
terms of the will of the deceased or under the laws of descent
and distribution, as the case may be. Texas protects the sur-
vivor through detailed statutes providing for a short form
community administration. These statutes require the com-
munity survivor to file a good and sufficient bond, conditioned
that he will faithfully administer the community estate and
pay one-half thereof to the person or persons entitled to
receive the same.55
50. Okla. Stat. (1941) §84-213.
51. McKay, "Community Property" §74 (1925).
52. Okla. Session Laws, 1945, pp. 120, 121, §15.
53. Tex. Stat., Rev. Civ. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 3667. Fidelity Union
Ins. Co. v. Hutchins, 134 Tex. 268, 133 S.W.2d 105, 109, 110(1939).
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Texas also holds that the community survivor need not
qualify under the administration statutes in order to sell
property to pay community debts."4
This discussion of what happens when the community
estate is dissolved by death of one of the spouses should give
emphasis to two points: first, that a new state adopting the
community property system has considerable choice available
in determining whether the existing laws of the intestate suc-
cession should be altered, and, second, that there is precedent
for both formal and informal administration of the commun-
ity estate.
Community Property and Federal Estate Taxes
With the passage of the Revenue Act of 1942 amending
Secs. 811 (e) (2) and 811 (g) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code,
Congress attempted to eliminate preferential treatment en-
joyed by those living in community property states respecting
the burdens of Federal Estate Taxes. The claim that the tax
load had been unevenly distributed results from the commun-
ity property concept that the surviving spouse does not inherit
his or her one-half interest in the community estate, having
owned it from the time of original acquisition as a matter of
right. Accordingly, only the one-half share owned by the
deceased spouse is properly subject to Federal Estate Taxes.
However, the Revenue Act of 1942 measures the tax by the
value of the entire community excepting only such part there-
of as may be shown to have been received as compensation
for personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse
or derived originally from such compensation or from sep-
arate property of the surviving spouse. Immediate question
was raised as to its constitutionality. In the cases of Fer-
nandez v. Wiener"5 and United States v. Rompe156 the validity
of the statute was upheld. The holding of the Court, however,
appears to be at variance with community property concepts
and results in the taxation of one person for property owned
by another.
There are many community property attorneys who feel
54. Kinard v. Sims, 53 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1932); Davis v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 134 Tex. 201, 134 S.W.2d 1042 (1940).
55. 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
56. 326 U.S. 367 (1945).
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that the basic concepts of the community property system
have been successfully attacked in the 1942 amendments to
the Internal Revenue Code and dissatisfaction with the hold-
ings of the Supreme Court in the Wiener and Rompel cases
has been general.57
The Husband's Power to Make Gifts of Community Property
From the time of the Spanish law, there have been dif-
ferences of opinion respecting the husband's power to make
gifts of community property. In a Nevada case58 the con-
dlusion is expressed that the husband may make a voluntary
disposition of a portion of the community property provided
the gift is reasonable with reference to the whole amount of
the community estate, and provided the gift has been made
with no intent to defraud the wife or defeat her claims. But
in the State of Washington in a life insurance case, Occidental
Life Insurance Co. v. Powers,59 it was held that a husband
was without power to make gifts of the community without
the wife's consent. In the case referred to, the Washington
Court was asked to decide whether a married man could name
his mother and his secretary as beneficiaries of a life in-
surance policy paid for with community funds.
In a thought-provoking dissent, the Washington Court
has said:
"However laudable may have been the desire of the court to
prevent the husband from leaving the wife penniless, it should
have treated the community property consisting of insurance
just as the law treats all other kinds of community property
because there is no basis for a legal distinction between them.
It should have recogniged the right of each spouse to provide
for the disposal of one half of the community property after
the termination of the community, rather than to have invoked
a rule not applicable to the situation. Had it done so, the
wife would have received one half of the avails of the insur-
ance as her share just the same as in the case of any other
community property for the reason that, since it belonged to
her, the husband had no right to dispose of it. Thus, as pro-
57. Problems of community property taxation have been covered by
Pedersen, Note, 45 Mich. Law Rev. 409-444 (1947).
58. Nixon v. Brown, 46 Nev. 439, 214 Pac. 524 (1923). This case con-
tains detailed references to Spanish authorities.
59. Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d
207, 114 AL.R. 531 (1937).
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vided by our community property system, she would not have
been 'left penniless.'
"It frequently happens that a widower with dependent chil-
dren remarries, takes out insurance for their benefit, and
thereafter dies during their dependency. The rule of the
Powers case prevents one from doing this even to the amount
of one half the proceeds and hence created a greater evil than
the one it attempted to correct. '60
The view contended for in the dissenting opinion aforesaid
is settled law in California.61
In a recent Washington case, the husband changed the
beneficiary of four insurance policies from the wife to his
executor in trust for a minor son,62 but in contrast to the
holding in the Powers case, the Court gave effect to the
change of beneficiary to the extent of one-half of the pro-
ceeds of the policies upon the theory that one-half belonged
to the wife in her own right, the other half being subject to
the husband's disposition.63
To sum up, three views have been definitely expressed.
One state says that the husband may make no gift of the
community. Another says that he may give away his one-half
interest but may not interfere with the one-half interest
which belongs to the wife. In the third state, gifts are valid
if reasonable in proportion to the community estate and are
made with no intent to defraud.6 4
Certain gifts made from moral duty might well be con-
sidered as within the sphere of ordinary and regular admin-
istration. Where no fraud exists and the action of the hus-
band seems reasonable in relation to the field of his entire
responsibilities, gifts to a dependent mother or father or to
the children of a first marriage should be upheld. Particu-
larly should this be so where the remaining community estate
60. Small v. Bartyzel, 177 P.2d 391, 393, 394 (Wash. 1947).
61. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 Pac.
61 (1923) ; McBride v. McBride, 143 Kan. 245, 54 P.2d 480 (1936).
62. In Re Towey's Estate, 22 Wash.2d 212, 155 P.2d 273 (1945).
63. In the dissenting opinion, Small v. Bartyzel, n. 60 supra, the
Court makes detailed comparison of the Powers and Towey cases,
concluding that no substantial difference exists. In the Powers
case the beneficiary change was to the husband's mother and sec-
retary. In the Towey case the change was to an executor in trust.
64. On the question of when the wife can complain of the husband's
gifts of community property to third persons by means of life
insurance, there is an excellent article by Huie in 18 Tex. Law
Rev. 121-150 (1940). This article also contains references to the
Spanish authorities.
19471
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
contains sufficient property to protect the one-half interest
of the wife.
Bank Accounts and Life Insurance
The community property laws are also effective as to
items of personal property. Two of the most important are
bank accounts and policies of life insurance. In the Okla-
homa Act of 19455 there is the following provision:
"Bank Deposits.
"Section 6. Any funds on deposit in any bank or banking,
institution, whether in the name of the husband or wife, shall
be presumed to be the separate property of the party in whose
name they stand, regardless of who made the deposit, and
unless said bank or banking institution is notified to the con-
trary, it shall be governed accordingly in honoring checks and
orders against such account."
This provision is also common to the statutes of Texas"6 and
to the new laws recently adopted in Oregon, Nebraska and
Pennsylvania. It appears fully justifiable under the theories
of the law merchant.
Similarly, laws designed to facilitate the payment of
policy proceeds by life companies have been enacted in a
number of states. These special statutes are intended to
absolve the insurer from further liability if payment is made
in accordance with the contract terms before notice of a claim
of community interest by a surviving spouse.67 These statutes
have had the effect intended, and have speeded up payment
of death claims in community property states, but it has been
65. Okla. Session Laws, 1945, pp.118, 119.
66. Tex. Stat., Rev. Civ. (Vernon, 1936), Art. 4622.
67. The following provision appears in the Nebraska, Michigan and
Oregon laws:
"Notwithstanding the provision of this act, when the pro-
ceeds of, or payments under, a policy or contract issued by
a life insurance company becomes payable and the company
makes payment thereof, in accordance with the terms thereof,
or in accordance with the terms of any written assignment
thereof if the policy or contract has been assigned, such pay-
ment shall fully discharge the company from all claims
under such policy or contract unless, before such payment
is made, the company has received, at its home office, written
notice by or on behalf of some other person that such other
person claims to be entitled to such payment or some interest
in the policy or contract."
Somewhat similar provisions appear in the general life insurance
laws of California, Texas and Washington.
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suggested that they do not go far enough. There are many
transactions involving a life policy other than the disburse-
ment of policy proceeds, such as policy loans, surrenders,
trust agreements, assignments, and beneficiary changes, to
name but a few. Some of these are similar to the ordinary
commercial transactions handled by banks, and again on the
theories of the law merchant it is submitted that a new state
adopting a community property system might properly give
to each spouse the full management and control over policies
of life insurance issued in their respective names. Such
statutes would not prevent subsequent accounting between
the spouses, but it is believed that they would avert much
of the litigation involving life policies in community property
states. Moreover, in the drafting of new statutes special
consideration should be given to the problems arising upon
divorce because in many instances, possibly through inadvert-
ence, the rights of the spouses respecting existing policies of
insurance are not determined by the divorce decree or by
separate property settlements. This field also has been a
fertile one for litigation in community property states.
There are many points of life insurance law respecting
community property which are yet to be settledes This re-
sults in part from the fact that life insurance was unknown
in the Spanish law and is in its widely accepted use a product
of the past century. Some concepts, however, are well set-
tled. If the husband is the insured and his estate the desig-
nated beneficiary and community funds have been used in
the payment of premiums, the policy proceeds belong to the
community. 69 The fact that the insurance proceeds in such
a case are received after termination of the marriage does
not make the moneys the separate property of the husband,
the chose having been created and acquired during marriage.
Conversely, where the husband is the insured and the
wife is the designated beneficiary, the policy proceeds are
the separate property of the wife even though community
funds have been used for the payment of premiums. The
68. Community property laws as applied to life insurance are fully
discussed by Huie in 17 Tex. Law Rev. 121, 151 (1939). De-
tailed annotations respecting life insurance cases are set forth
in 114 A.L.R. 545 (1938), 168 A.L.R. 342 (1947).
69. Hardin v. Volunteer State Life Ins Co., 193 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.
1946). This is the Court of Civil Appeal's opinion. It was re-
versed by the Texas Supreme Court in 197 S.W.2d 105, 168 A.L.R.
337 (1946), but on another point. Martin v. Moran, 11 Tex. Civ.
App. 509, 32 S.W. 904 (1895).
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uniform theory is that the husband has made a gift to the
wife and the policy proceeds in such a case are not subject
to community debts unless the husband has acted fraudulently,
nor does right of reimbursement in favor of the community
exist.o Under the set of facts aforementioned where the
right to change the beneficiary has been reserved, the gift
is imperfect during the husband's life and if he changes the
beneficiary from his wife to his estate, the policy proceeds
become community. If he should attempt to bhange the bene-
ficiary to a third person, the question of whether the third
party may receive the policy proceeds depends upon the ex-
tent of the husband's power to make a gift of community
funds without the consent of his wife. These cases have been
discussed in the preceding section of this paper.
Inconclusion, the idea of common property in the home
gives legal emphasis and encouragement to the family's posi-
tion as a social unit. This is a conservative force which seems
worthy of preservation and deserving of general recognition,
and while the following quoted statements may be considered
idealistic in nature, I believe that they incorporate the basic
concepts of the community property system:
"Marriage is a joint enterprise between equals, in the nature
of a partnership, for the accomplishment of economic as well
as social objectives, all of which ar as important to one spouse
as to the other . . .
"Both spouses should, and ordinarily do, contribute their full
efforts to the attainment of all of the objectives to which their
endeavors were pledged . . .
"One field of marital activity is as important as the other, so
that the spouses share equally, each as of right, in the economic
gains . . .
"This system takes nothing which originally belonged to one
spouse and gives it to the other, but rewards each equally for
his or her equally valuable contributions to the common enter-
prise. 7 1
I do not pretend to believe that any property system is
able to accomplish all of its ideals, but speaking generally
people who live under the community system like it.
70. San Jacinto Building, Inc. v. Brown, 79 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1935);
Evans v. Opperman, 76 Tex. 293, 13 S.W. 312 (1890); numerous
authorities from other states in support of these propositions are
contained in Prof. Huie's article and in the A.L.R. annotations,
supra, n. 68, 69.
71. Appellee's Brief. United States v. Rompel, supra n. 55 at 21.
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